Notational matters: Perhaps it will help if I translate some of the logical notation into everyday English. Sentence (2) on p. 71 can be read as follows: For any person x and any proposition p, if x fears that p, then they desire that it’s not the case that p. Or, more colloquially: Whenever someone fears that something is the case, then they desire that the opposite is the case. Sentence (3): Whenever someone hopes that something is the case and then discovers that it is in fact the case, then they are pleased that it’s the case. Sentence (4): Whenever someone believes that something is the case and also believes that if that thing is the case then something else must also be the case, then (barring confusion, distraction, etc.) they will believe that the something else is in fact the case.

The big picture: It’s very easy to miss the big picture with Churchland’s argument, so here are a few things to try to keep clear on. First, what is Folk Psychology? Harder still, what is it to have a smooth (or even a rough) reduction of folk psychology? For it to be reduced, the theory has to be largely true. But Churchland thinks folk psychology is in fact far from true. Why would one think it is true in the first place? And why does Churchland think that it is instead false? Finally, to get the big picture: In the first sentence, Churchland talks about the ontology of folk psychology getting replaced. What the heck does that mean?